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Comparing EU and US Responses 
to the Financial Crisis 
Karel Lannoo* 
 
Since 2003, the EU and the US have conducted a vibrant regulatory dialogue on financial regulation, but domestic priorities 
seem to have taken precedence in response to the financial crisis. This paper compares the institutional and regulatory 
changes occurring on both sides of the Atlantic. On the institutional side, it compares macro- and micro-prudential reforms. 
On the regulatory side, it compares four key areas: bank capital requirements, reform of the OTC derivative markets, and 
the regulation of credit ratings agencies and hedge funds. It concludes by highlighting certain implications for the 
regulatory dialogue. 
 
he EU and the US are in the midst of a fundamental 
institutional and regulatory overhaul in response to 
the financial crisis. This process is primarily driven 
by domestic agendas, but G-20 commitments also come into 
play. The final outcome of the reforms is not yet known, but 
policy frameworks differ substantially on both sides. On the 
EU side, the initiative is primarily with the EU Commission 
and the member states in the EU Council, and here the 
contours are clear. On the US side, the initiative is with 
Congress, and changes every day. Senate proposals, for 
example, differ fundamentally from those of the White 
House. Hence, an analysis of the final shape of the US 
regulatory overhaul is part guesswork. 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman, the EU and the US saved 
their financial systems through massive state aid, with 
equity participation and debt support for the financial sector. 
Their central banks, primarily the Bank of England, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve have 
provided massive liquidity to the financial system, and have, 
primarily in the case of the UK and the US, bought 
securities directly in the market, otherwise known as 
quantitative easing.  
The Institutional Response 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the role of central banks is 
pivotal to the debate on the adaptation of the structure of 
financial oversight. Although the end result is not yet fully 
known, it is clear that there is a firm consensus among the 
EU member states for structural reform, which will, over 
time, lead to a more integrated structure for financial 
supervision. Some EU member states have also engaged in 
reforming their domestic supervisory structure. On the US 
side, much will depend on the outcome of initiatives taken 
in Congress. Congress seems to be heading for a more 
fundamental reform of the US supervisory system, an 
opportunity the White House evidently missed. Capitol 
Hill’s recent moves are focused on reining in the powers of 
the Fed, whereas the White House proposed very different 
solutions. This also runs counter to what is happening in the 
EU. 
The Macro-Prudential Side 
The Council of Finance (Ecofin) Ministers on 9 June 2009 
agreed upon a new structure of supervision in the EU, 
essentially consisting of four new entities: a European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and a European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS), which comprise three 
functional authorities (see figure below). The Council 
thereby largely implemented the proposals of the de 
Larosière report. The Council conclusions describe the 
framework and responsibilities of the new supervisory 
bodies in great detail. Successively, they were laid down in 
draft EU legislation, which was provisionally adopted by 
the finance ministers on 2 December 2009, awaiting the 
decisions of the European Parliament. The implementation 
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of both decisions, however, still raises problems of a 
conceptual nature for the ESRB and of an operational nature 
for the ESFS. 
The ESRB will be at the centre of the new system in the EU, 
even if this body is only consultative. Its twelve-member 
Steering Committee is composed of the seven European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) members (including the 
President of the ECB), the three chairs of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), a member of the EU 
Commission and the President of the Economic and 
Financial Committee (EFC). The dominance of central 
bankers in the ESRB’s new governance structure is even 
clearer in its General Board, which comprises (apart from 
the Steering Committee members) all the central bank 
governors of the EU27. 
The ESRB will reside within the ECB and rely on the 
analytical and administrative services and skills of this well-
reputed and established institution. The ESRB will thus also 
be controlled by the ECB. The finance ministers have only 
one representative in the ESRB. Notwithstanding the 
declaration of the finance ministers on 9 June 2009 that they 
want to be in the driver’s seat, the power at the top of the 
new structure will reside with central bankers. 
The task is now essentially for the ECB to bring the ESRB 
into existence. Although the ESRB can count on formidable 
back-office support from the ECB, it will face significant 
conceptual and institutional challenges, related to the core 
function of the new body: to define, identify and prioritise 
all macro-financial risks. The ECB needs to realise that the 
responsibility it takes on in assuming this task could 
negatively impact its reputation in the future, and eventually 
its independence in setting monetary policy.
1 Acting on 
possible macro-financial threats could contravene the ECB’s 
price stability objectives. Hence, in order to preserve 
monetary policy independence, the ESRB should be 
sufficiently detached from the ECB. 
                                                        
1 It should be recalled that the ECB already has a committee under 
its roof with responsibility for some of the functions expected of 
the ESRB. Its Banking Supervisory Committee (BSC) brings 
together banking supervisors of all the EU countries, and not only 
the eurozone, to discuss macro-prudential and financial stability 
issues. In response to criticism on the lack of macro-prudential 
oversight in the EU, the ECB explicitly indicated in 2001 that its 
Banking Supervision Committee would perform that role. See 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), Report on financial 
crisis management (Brouwer 2 report), July, 2001, p. 7. It is 
expected that as a result of the crisis financial stability will become 
a more pronounced objective of the ECB. See Paul De Grauwe 
and Daniel Gros, A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 191, Brussels: CEPS, June 2009, available from 
www.ceps.eu.  
In the US, the White House plan gives the Fed a greater role 
in micro-prudential supervision, thereby ensuring the 
supervision of all systemically important firms. By contrast, 
macro-prudential supervision would move to the Financial 
Services Oversight Council (FSOC). The Secretary of the 
Treasury will chair this new body with the participation of 
all the chairs of the relevant supervisory authorities: the Fed, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of 
Thrift Supervision, the future Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Commodity and Futures Trading 
Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
and the federal Housing Finance Agency. Also, the US 
House Wall Street Reform Act and Senate Banking 
Committee proposals would create an agency to monitor 
and address systemic risks posed by large financial 
companies separate from the Fed.
2 This agency will have 
the authority to impose stricter prudential rules and to break 
up financial companies to prevent them from being ‘too big 
to fail’. It will allow the Secretary of the Treasury to make a 
systemic risk assessment of a financial company. The House 
Act will curtail the powers of the Fed to provide emergency 
lending, which could only occur upon the written 
determination of the Council, and after written consent of 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Hence, concerning macro-prudential supervision, the main 
difference between the EU and US resides in the role of the 
central bank. In the US, the Treasury will take the central 
role, and the FSOC’s decisions will be binding. In Europe, 
the ESRB will be controlled by the central bankers, but will 
act in an informal and consultative capacity. Given the 
difficulty of defining and identifying systemic risk, the 
European solution of creating a purely consultative body, 
separate from the central bank, finance ministers or 
supervisors, is the right way forward. It respects their 
respective roles in financial supervision and monetary 
policy, and protects them from the fall-out of erroneous 
 
decisions. Questions could be raised, however, about the 
composition of the ESRB, which is almost entirely in the 
hands of central bankers. A monolithic composition may 
prevent out-of-the-box thinking, which is why this bubble 
was missed.
3 
                                                        
2 The “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009” 
(H.R. 4173) was adopted by the House of Representatives on 11 
December 2009. 
3 See “If Fed Missed This Bubble, Will It See a New One?”, New 
York Times, 6 January 2010. 
Table 1. Proposed institutional reforms in the EU and US 
  EU  US White House  US House/Senate Proposals 
Macro 
prudential 
European Systemic Risk Board (only 
consultative, based within ECB) 
Financial Services Oversight 
Council (run by US Treasury) 
Financial Services Oversight Council (run by 
US Treasury) 
Micro 
prudential 
European System of Financial 
Supervisors: network of three functional 
EU supervisory authorities with legal 
personality 
-  Greater role for Fed 
-  Merger of OCC and OTS 
-  Creation of Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency  
-  Fed shrinks back to monetary policy (Senate) 
-  Single financial regulator (Senate) 
-  Merger of OCC and OTS (House Act) 
-  Federal insurance regulator (House Act) 
-  Consumer Financial Protection Agency Comparing EU and US Responses to the Financial Crisis | 3 
The micro-prudential side 
The most important change on the EU side is the creation of 
the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). The 
ESFS will be composed of three authorities: the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and 
Occupational Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities Market Authority (ESMA). The creation of these 
three authorities could be seen as a simple upgrade of the 
existing committees with similar names. However, their 
status and tasks have changed dramatically. The authorities 
will become separate legal entities, with supervisory 
responsibilities (such as the participation in supervisory 
colleges of international groups and the control of national 
supervisory authorities) and extensive regulatory tasks (such 
as the realisation of a single rulebook and the consistent 
application of EU law). While a lack of cooperation of 
supervisors during the crisis amply demonstrated the need 
for regime change, the workload of the new committees is 
daunting. 
In the US, the lack of reform in securities and insurance 
supervision in the White House proposals is disappointing. 
The failure of the securitisation market as well as the 
regulatory cracks in US insurance supervision called for a 
radical reform. There are few arguments to justify the 
separation of the SEC and the CFTC. Moreover, the case of 
AIG highlighted the need for a single US insurance 
supervisor. Seen from Europe, it is as if the White House is 
incapable of countering vested interests. On the other hand, 
the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency as a 
new entity is something to be applauded. Consumer 
protection matters may get lost in the functional EU 
structure. 
Given these rather timid US administration proposals, it is 
not surprising that parts of Capitol Hill are calling for more 
intrusive regulation. The 1,136-page plan by Senator 
Christopher Dodd, presented on 10 November 2009, differs 
in major respects from both the White House and Congress 
plans. The proposal would merge the current federal 
supervisory oversight of the banking system from four 
agencies into one new agency, stripping these powers from 
the Federal Reserve. According to observers, the Fed has 
been under more intense attack in Capitol Hill than at any 
time in recent decades.
4 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, on the other hand, would gain greater 
authority and more resources under Senator Dodd’s plan.  
The House 1,500-page Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, voted on 11 December 2009, treads the 
middle ground between the White House and Senate 
proposals. It does not yet propose a single regulator, but 
creates a federal insurance regulator, introduces more 
control of the Fed by the Treasury, and increases the powers 
of the SEC. It maintains some proposals of the White House 
plan, such as the merger of the OCC and OTS, and the 
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. 
                                                        
4 See “Under Attack, Fed Chief Studies Politics”, New York Times, 
11 November 2009.  
The Regulatory Response 
Lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic face a busy 
regulatory agenda. It comprises a series of measures 
following on commitments in the G-20 context and/or 
responses to domestic shortcomings highlighted by the 
crisis. We will compare the regulatory responses in four 
exemplary areas: bank capital requirements, the 
centralisation of OTC markets, the regime of credit rating 
agencies and the regulation of hedge funds. 
Bank capital requirements 
Current capital regulation, the so-called Basel II plan, 
requires a major overhaul, given the depth of the crisis and 
the fallacy of the present framework. So far, policy-makers 
have been wary of completely scrapping a hard-won 
agreement, and have reverted instead to further amendments 
and add-ons. The Basel capital adequacy rules, which were 
implemented in the EU with the Capital Requirements 
Directive, serve as the centrepiece of prudential regulation 
of the banking sector. Initially proposed in 1988, the rules 
were substantially amended in 2005, generalising the use of 
credit ratings for risk weightings in the external ratings-
based approach, and the use of internal models for more 
advanced financial institutions (Basel II). Basel sets a 
minimum capital requirement of 8% for the banking book, 
but the differentiation of risk weightings prevented 
supervisors from noticing the growing degree of leverage in 
the financial system. However, the US has not yet 
implemented the Basel II changes, fearing that it would 
reduce the level of core capital. It has now committed to do 
so by 2011, but only for the big top 20 banks, as it had 
always made clear. The US applies the simpler Basel I 
framework for the rest of its banking system, and a 
maximum leverage ratio. 
In reaction to the limitations of the framework, supervisors 
on both sides have made changes to the existing rules, and 
have agreed on additional building blocks. Since the start of 
the crisis, EU regulators have already made two sets of 
amendments to the Basel framework. One was agreed in 
April 2009; a second set is still on the table. A widely 
discussed amendment both in the EU and the US is the 5% 
‘skin in the game’ requirement. It mandates banks to hold at 
least 5% (initially 10%) of the securitisation issuance in 
credit risk transfer products, in order to provide the 
incentive to monitor in ‘originate and distribute’ activities.  
In Pittsburgh, the G-20 stated that “all major G-20 financial 
centres commit to have adopted the Basel II Capital 
Framework by 2011,” but added that “the quantity and 
quality of bank capital” needs to be improved. The G-20 
recommended countercyclical buffers (dynamic 
provisioning), a leverage ratio, and liquidity requirements.
5 
One gets the impression that leaders, mainly in the EU, are 
unable or unwilling to accept that Basel II should be 
scrapped entirely, in favour of a simpler and more 
transparent capital regime. 
                                                        
5 Detailed proposals along these lines where made by the Basel 
Committee on 17 December 2009. 4 | Karel Lannoo 
Divergent accounting standards make the comparison of 
capital requirements difficult, an element on which the EU 
and the US remain at some distance apart. The EU has 
adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
whereas the US continues to apply its own standards (US 
GAAP – Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). On 
some key elements of a bank’s balance sheet, IFRS and 
USGAAP are entirely incomparable. IFRS deals with gross 
exposures, while under GAAP, derivatives are represented 
at their net value, resulting in entirely different balance 
sheets, and presenting EU banks as being overleveraged.
6 
The US SEC has now adopted a roadmap for adopting IFRS 
by 2014, but many uncertainties lay ahead.  
The regime of credit rating agencies 
Rating agencies were an early victim of the financial crisis. 
Already in September 2007, a consensus emerged that rating 
agencies were to blame for part of the trouble, after having 
been threatened several times before with regulatory action. 
The implementation of new regulation differs importantly, 
however.
7 
In spite of the much proclaimed US-EU transatlantic 
dialogue, regulation of credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
remains an area of fundamental divergence and contention 
between the world’s two largest economic blocs. On 24 
April 2009 the European Parliament and European Council 
adopted the Commission’s proposal for a regulation (‘the 
EU regulation’). The US Congress approved The Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act (‘the Act’) on 29 September 
2006, which was implemented in different SEC rules. 
Although the EU and US approaches share certain 
principles, such as greater transparency and organisational 
requirements concerning conflicts of interest and corporate 
governance, the philosophies underlying the interventions 
are quite different.
8  
The EU approach depends on a framework of strict 
surveillance of methodologies and ratings and detailed 
registration requirements. The EU regulation cements the 
status quo, by raising barriers of entry in the rating business 
and providing an implicit recognition to registered CRAs. 
By contrast, the Act specifically prohibits the SEC from 
interfering with ratings and methodologies, aiming at 
reducing investors’ over-reliance on ratings and injecting 
competition in the CRA market. Since the Act’s approval, 
the SEC has granted Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization (NRSRO) status to 11 different 
agencies and proposed to eliminate references to ratings in 
regulation for broker-dealers, money market funds and 
investment companies (though amendments to the rules 
have yet to be approved). 
                                                        
6 See, for example, the case of Deutsche Bank, one of the few 
banks reporting under both standards. 
7 For a more detailed comparison, see Piero Cinquegrana, “The 
Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies: A Comparative 
Perspective, May 2009, available from 
www.eurocapitalmarkets.org.  
8 On 12 June 2009 the European Commission asked the 
Committee for European Securities Regulators (CESR) to issue 
technical advice on a framework of mutual recognition toward 
Canada, USA and Japan for CRA regulation.  
The two different approaches stem from different analyses 
of the industrial organisation of the ratings business. On the 
one hand, US authorities believe that they can re-establish a 
competitive, reputation-driven market for ratings by 
eliminating the regulatory license and enhancing 
competition and transparency. In this view, regulation has 
established a state-sanctioned oligopoly, forcing investors to 
use ratings of registered CRA. By eliminating references of 
ratings in regulation, CRAs would compete on the quality of 
ratings and investors would be free to choose the agency 
they trust the most.
9  
On the other hand, EU authorities believe that ratings 
shopping is dangerous because it would lead to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ with issuers paying for the highest ratings and 
financial companies in the position to choose whatever 
rating fits their purposes. The proposal implicitly 
acknowledges that ratings are an essential component of 
risk-sensitive prudential regulation and that other market-
based measures would heighten the pro-cyclicality of the 
capital requirements regime. In short, EU authorities aim to 
promote CRAs’ accountability through supervision, whereas 
US authorities prefer market discipline through transparency 
and competition.
10 
Centralisation of OTC derivatives markets 
Current proposals in the EU and US are driven by similar 
intentions. However, the devil is in the detail, so in the end 
the regulatory approaches of both parties could substantially 
diverge.
11 
In the US, three main legislative texts have been circulating, 
and the text is currently being discussed in the US Senate. 
The European Commission drafted two communications 
(July and October 2009), and legislative proposals will 
appear by mid-2010. The regulatory intervention in the US 
will be accomplished through ad hoc regulation, while in the 
EU the Commission will amend existing directives and 
propose new rules. Both regulators aim at ensuring financial 
stability for the largest global financial market. The two 
proposals, therefore, envisage a set of measures to achieve 
greater transparency and a safer, more stable market 
infrastructure, in order to mitigate counterparty risk and 
encourage a more responsible use of these complex 
instruments. 
Although they share high and valuable commitments, the 
current texts differ in the detail in several aspects. On the 
clearing side, OTC derivatives will be gradually pushed 
towards centralised solutions, mainly central counterparty 
clearinghouses (CCPs). In the EU this will happen by 
                                                        
9 The House Act of 11 December 2009 would require additional 
disclosures by and internal controls for credit rating agencies. 
10 On 28 October 2009 the House Financial Services Committee 
approved the H.R. 3890, the Accountability and Transparency in 
Rating Agencies Act, introduced by Congressman Kanjorski (D-
PA). If approved by both the House floor and Senate, this piece of 
legislation brings the US a step closer to the EU by making CRAs 
legally liable for their ratings and imposing stricter organisational 
requirements on conflicts of interest and corporate governance. 
11 For more, see Diego Valiante, “Shaping reforms and possible 
reforms for OTC derivatives”, forthcoming in ECMI, 2010. Comparing EU and US Responses to the Financial Crisis | 5 
pushing all standardised contracts on CCPs, disregarding the 
difference between standardised and CCP-eligible 
derivatives. In the US, however, only eligible contracts will 
be centrally cleared by derivatives clearing organisations 
(DCOs), and only if both parties are dealers and/or major 
swap participants, and after the approval of both SEC and 
CFTC. The authorities may force DCOs to accept a 
derivative. For contracts that are not centrally cleared, 
legislators on both sides of the Atlantic will impose higher 
capital charges and margin requirements. The EU 
Commission is proposing to extend capital charges for 
everyone and margin requirements for non-financial 
institutions using derivatives only above a certain threshold. 
The US, instead, exempts from these requirements non-
financial firms, “identified banking products,” and positions 
held for hedging or risk management purposes. This 
exemption increases the range of products that will be 
eligible for exemption. 
Both proposals will push the trading of centrally-cleared 
derivatives on organised trading venues (exchanges or 
ATSs). The European Commission is discussing the 
extension of the 2004 Market in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) to all standardised derivatives, which 
implies huge changes in trading practices. 
As stated previously, transparency plays a pivotal role in 
forthcoming legislation. Again, the two positions differ, as 
US authorities will only publish data at aggregate level with 
the possibility to receive individual data only on a 
confidential basis. EU authorities, instead, may in addition 
publish information on single trades. Data repository will be 
mandatory for all transactions in the EU and for non-
centrally cleared transactions in the US.
12 On both sides of 
the Atlantic competition between multiple data repositories 
does not seem to be a source of concern, even though the 
US will probably converge on the DTCC model. 
On supervision, while the US designed a co-habitation 
system between CFTC and SEC respectively for commodity 
and securities derivatives, the EU is still in a period of 
transition regarding its supervisory architecture, following 
the de Larosiere proposal. However, cooperation at G-20 
and EU-US levels may help to make final texts more 
comparable. 
Finally, the US legislative act calls for limiting the stake of 
frequent users of derivatives in the ownership of DCOs 
below the 20%. This rule aims at containing conflicts of 
interests when DCOs should decide the accessibility of a 
derivative transaction to central clearing. 
The supervision of hedge funds 
Another contentious issue is the role and oversight of hedge 
funds in the crisis.
13 Further to the G-20’s commitment in 
London to regulate all institutions, markets and instruments, 
                                                        
12 This was also withheld in the House Act of 11 December 2009.  
13 For more, see Karel Lannoo, “Bringing hedge funds into the 
regulatory mainstream”, June 2009, available from 
www.eurocapitalmarkets.org; Nixon Peabody, “The Inevitability 
of Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S, April 2007, available from 
www.HG.org. 
on 29 April 2009 the EU proposed a very detailed draft 
directive for the regulation of Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers (AIFM), including hedge funds and private 
equity. The US, on the other hand, has not yet gone that far, 
but is considering a lighter form of regulation in the form of 
registration requirement, as with CRAs. Neither jurisdiction 
had a specific regulatory scheme for hedge funds 
beforehand. 
As with CRAs, the regulation of hedge funds had already 
been on the agenda before the crisis started. In the EU, 
European socialist parties have been campaigning since 
2006 for more supervision of hedge funds and private 
equity. In the US, the SEC enacted a Hedge Fund Rule in 
2006, but the rule was invalidated by the US Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The broad motivation 
for more regulation is similar on both sides: the current 
absence of oversight; the lack of transparency and public 
disclosure; the ‘retailisation’ of hedge funds; instances of 
fraud; and concern of systemic risk. 
The EU’s draft directive applies to managers of alternative 
investment funds – wherever they are registered – not only 
to the funds. In this sense, and by adding a reciprocity 
provision, the Commission ensures that the whole non-
harmonised funds sector is covered. The draft directive 
applies some ‘generous’ thresholds: it will not be applicable 
to leveraged funds below €100 million, and to non-
leveraged funds below €500 million. Such thresholds do not 
apply to investment advisers and asset managers that fall 
under the EU’s MiFID (brokers) or UCITS (investment 
funds) rules. A new US proposal by Democratic Rep. Paul 
Kanjorski of Pennsylvania would require private pools of 
capital with more than $30 million in assets to register with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, with the 
exception of venture capital funds. Senator Dodd’s proposal 
would require that hedge funds with more than $100 million 
in assets be registered with the SEC and disclose financial 
information. Practically, this would mean that affected funds 
would have to disclose information about their fees, risks, 
trading practices, and other elements of their business, 
which brings the proposal closer to what is being discussed 
in the EU. The Private Fund Investment Advisers 
Registration Act, part of Title V of the new House Act, 
requires registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 of most private fund advisers, including advisers of 
hedge funds and private equity firms, as well as new record-
keeping and disclosure requirements. US proposals thus 
seem to go in the same direction as what is on the table in 
the EU. 
Interestingly, opponents of more regulation of hedge funds 
advance the same argument on both sides: the danger of the 
loss of competitiveness of the domestic capital market. They 
seem to have missed the momentum behind the G-20 
process. 6 | Karel Lannoo 
Table 2. Financial regulation reforms in the EU and US 
 EU  US 
Bank capital 
requirements 
Amendments to 
capital requirements 
directive 
-  5% securitisation 
-  More capital for 
trading 
Basel II to be 
implemented by 2011 
for large firms 
-  5% securitisation 
OTC markets  All standardised 
contracts centrally 
cleared 
Only eligible contracts 
centrally cleared 
Credit rating 
agencies 
April 2009 
regulation: strict 
regulation of industry 
Registration 
requirement, tighter 
conduct regulation 
Hedge funds  April 2009 draft 
directive  
Proposals for 
registration, more 
disclosure 
Conclusion 
On the institutional side, the EU and the US seem to be 
moving in radically different directions, with (most likely) 
reduced powers for the Fed in the US, and more for the ECB 
in Europe. The US Financial Services Oversight Council in 
the US will be chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
composed of all regulators, including the Fed. The EU 
Systemic Risk Board, on the other hand, will be chaired by 
a central banker, most likely the ECB president, and largely 
composed of central bank representatives, with only one 
delegate from among the EU’s finance ministers. On the 
micro-prudential side, the EU is gradually moving towards a 
more integrated model of functional supervision, whereas 
the US proposals do not seem to go far enough at the 
present time. 
On the regulatory side, where the EU was initially in the 
lead, both blocs have recently started to converge, with 
proposals on credit rating agencies and hedge funds, largely 
as a result of initiatives in the US Congress. Hence, even if 
institutional responses differ, regulatory responses are more 
aligned. In addition, this process is now helped by G-20 
commitments. 
The concern, however, is that parties may not grant 
equivalence. Recent rules, such as the EU’s CRA regulation 
and draft hedge funds directive, set tight conditions for third 
country access to the EU market, which have prompted 
certain groups to raise concerns about the competitiveness 
of the EU financial market. Interestingly, similar objections 
are heard in the US regarding Congress initiatives. The 
continuation of the dialogue, at all levels, is therefore 
necessary to ensure an unambiguous response to the crisis 
and to avoid unintended consequences. This is even more 
imperative in the G-20 context, where the US and EU need 
to show their global partners that they are adopting similar 
solutions. 
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Source: Adapted from European Commission (2009). 
  
 
About ECMI 
 
The European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) was established as an independent non-
profit organisation in October 1993, in a collaborative effort by the European Federation 
of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS), the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) and the International Securities Market Association (ISMA), now the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA). ECMI is managed and staffed by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Its membership is composed of 
exchanges, banks, trade associations and academics. 
European capital markets have experienced rapid growth in recent years, corresponding 
to the gradual shift away from relationship banking as a source of funding and at the 
same time, have had to absorb and implement the massive output of EU-level regulation 
required to create a single market for financial services. These developments, combined 
with the immense challenges presented to European financial institutions by the 
globalisation of financial markets, highlight the importance of an independent entity to 
undertake and disseminate research on European capital markets. 
The principal objective of ECMI is therefore to provide a forum in which market 
participants, policy-makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions 
concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, fairness and competitiveness of 
European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. These exchanges are 
fuelled by the publications ECMI regularly produces for its members: quarterly 
newsletters, annual reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research 
papers, as well as occasional workshops and conferences. ECMI also advises European 
regulators on policy-related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction between 
academic research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach to the subject. 
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